图书简介
A unique mix of American and European journal articles, written from an applied and empirical perspective. This is a handy tool for teachers in game theory and industrial organisation. For use in both economics departments and on MBA programmes., it is compiled and introduced by the leading writer in this field.
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Harvard Library
Princeton University Library
Preface; Introduction; Part I. Market Structure: 1. Game theory and industry studies: an introductory overview John Sutton; 2. Game-theoretic models of market concentration: sunk costs and market structure - a review article Richard Schmalensee; 3. Expanding markets: capacity expansion in the titanium dioxide industry Pankaj Ghemawat; 4. Declining markets: the devolution of declining industries Pankaj Ghemawat and Barry Nalebuff; 5. Empirical evidence: exit from declining industries - ’shakeout’ or ’stakeout’? Marvin B. Lieberman; Part II. Industrial Pricing and Pricing Schemes: 6. Intertemporal pricing schemes: experimental tests of consciously parallel behaviour in oligopoly Ronald Harstad, Stephen Martin and Hans-Theo Normann; 7. Spatial pricing schemes: on the strategic choice of spatial price policy Jacques-François Thisse and Xavier Vives; 8. Best-price policies: facilitating practices - the effects of advance notice and best-price policies Charles A. Holt and David T. Scheffman; 9. Vertical pricing schemes: vertical restraints and producers’ competition Patrick Rey and Joseph Stiglitz; 10. Price discrimination in a common market: international price discrimination in the European car market Frank Verboven; 11. Tacit collusion (I): interfirm rivalry in a repeated game - an empirical test of tacit collusion Margaret E. Slade; 12. Tacit collusion (II): collusive equilibrium in the great salt duopoly Ray Rees; Part III. Competition Policy: 13. Collusion and predation: on the detection of collusion and predation Louis Phlips; 14. Vertical restraints: vertical restraints in European competition policy J. A. Kay; 15. Franchising agreements: economic assessment of competition law provisions applicable to franchising OECD; 16. Joint R&D ventures: cooperative and noncooperative R&D in duopoly with spillovers C. d’Aspremont and A. Jacquemin; Part IV. Mergers and Merger Control: 17. Unprofitable exogenous mergers: losses from horizontal merger - the effects of an exogenous change in industry structure on Cournot-Nash equilibrium S. W. Salant, S. Switzer and R. J. Reynolds; 18. Profitable horizontal mergers and welfare: horizontal mergers - an equilibrium analysis Joseph Farrell and Carl Shapiro; 19. Using the Herfindahl-Hirschman index: horizontal mergers - comment Gregory J. Werden; 20. Cournot and merger control: horizontal mergers - reply Joseph Farrell and Carl Shapiro; 21.Vertical mergers: vertical mergers in multi-product industries and Edgeworth’s paradox of taxation Michael A. Salinger; 22. Enforcement of the US merger guidelines: empirical evidence on FTC enforcement of the merger guidelines Malcolm B. Coate and Fred S. McChesney; 23. Enforcement of the European merger regulation: the merger decisions of the European Commission Damien Neven, Robin Nuttall and Paul Seabright; Index.
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