Reform for Sale(Elements in Law, Economics and Politics)

销售改革:具有道德风险摩擦的常见代理模型

行政学

售   价:
169.00
发货周期:国外库房发货,通常付款后6-8周到货!
作      者
出  版 社
出版时间
2023年01月01日
装      帧
平装
ISBN
9781009285582
复制
页      码
75
语      种
英文
综合评分
暂无评分
我 要 买
- +
库存 30 本
  • 图书详情
  • 目次
  • 买家须知
  • 书评(0)
  • 权威书评(0)
图书简介
Lobbying competition is viewed as a delegated common agency game under moral hazard. Several interest groups try to influence a policy-maker who exerts effort to increase the probability that a reform be implemented. With no restriction on the space of contribution schedules, all equilibria perfectly reflect the principals’ preferences over alternatives. As a result, lobbying competition reaches efficiency. Unfortunately, such equilibria require that the policy-maker pays an interest group when the latter is hurt by the reform. When payments remain non-negative, inducing effort requires leaving a moral hazard rent to the decision maker. Contributions schedules no longer reflect the principals’ preferences, and the unique equilibrium is inefficient. Free-riding across congruent groups arises and the set of groups active at equilibrium is endogenously derived. Allocative efficiency and redistribution of the aggregate surplus is linked altogether and both depend on the set of active principals, as well as on the group size.
本书暂无推荐
本书暂无推荐
看了又看
  • 上一个
  • 下一个